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Introduction
Thirty-seven seconds. Due to a federal statutory damages cap, that is the time it took 
Wal-Mart to make enough money to pay a recent damage award to a former disabled employee 
for intentional, egregious discrimination.1 Patrick Brady, who has cerebral palsy, applied for a 
sales associate job at Wal- Mart in the summer of 2002.2 During the application process, Wal-
Mart made several inquiries prohibited by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)3 and 
specifically prohibited by a previous consent decree it entered into with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).4 It hired Brady nevertheless, but over the course of the next 
few months, subjected him to adverse work conditions based on his disability including transfer 
from the pharmacy department to pushing carts and a hostile work environment.5
Brady brought suit against Wal-Mart and the store manager, alleging violations of the 
ADA and the New York Human Rights Law.6 Brady also claimed intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and negligence in Wal-Mart’s hiring, supervising, and retaining employees.7
At trial, a jury awarded $9,114 in back pay, $2.5 million for emotional pain and suffering, and 
1 Brady v. Wal-Mart, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12151, *11-12 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
2 Id. at *2.
3
 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101 et seq. (2005).
4 Brady, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12151 at *2.
5 Id. 
6 Id.
7 Id. at *3.
nominal damages of $1 each for the reasonable accommodation and improper application 
inquiries claims.8 It also awarded a total of $5 million in punitive damages.9
Because the ADA incorporates the remedies provided under the Civil Rights Act of 
1991,10 Magistrate Judge Orenstein was required under 42 USCS 1981a(b)(3)(D) to reduce the 
award to comply with a damages cap.11 Under that statute, in actions for intentional 
discrimination in employment, the total of both compensatory and punitive damage awards may 
not exceed certain limits based on the number of people employed by the offending employer.12
Therefore, an employer like Wal-Mart, with more than 500 employees, would only have to pay a 
maximum of $300,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.13 In his opinion, Judge Orenstein 
states that his ruling “respects the law, but it does not achieve a just result.”14
To be sure, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was a victory for advocates of civil rights and 
fair employment practices. It succeeded enormously in bringing the remedies afforded to women 
and the disabled more in line with victims of other types of discrimination. However, several 
potential problems with the application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 remain. One of these 
problems is equal protection regarding the absence of caps on damages for discrimination based 
on race and national origin.15 In addition, plaintiffs may argue, on equal protection grounds, that 
they should not get less of a damage award for the same reprehensible conduct just because their 
employer has fewer employees.16 Conversely, defendants with many employees may argue they 
8 Id. at *5-6.
9 Id. 
10 See Mary L. Topliff, Annotation, Remedies Available Under Americans with Disabilities Act, 136 A.L.R. Fed. 63 
(2004).
11 Brady, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12151 at *8.
12
 42 U.S.C.S. 1981a(b)(3)(D)(2005).
13 See id.
14 Brady, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12151 at *10.
15 See Kelly Koenig Levi, Allowing a Title VII Punitive Damage Award Without an Accompanying Compensatory or 
Nominal Award: Further Unifying the Federal Civil Rights Laws, 89 KY. L. J. 581, 596-598 (2000). 
16 See CATHCART, DAVID ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991, 13 (1993).
should not have to pay more for the same conduct just because they employ more people.17
These potential problems, however, are outside the scope of this comment and thus will not be 
addressed. 
In this comment, I will seek to answer the question of how to achieve a “just result” 
under 1981a without losing sight of the congressional intent to protect small businesses from 
exorbitant damages. Part I outlines the history and purpose of punitive damages as deterrence, 
punishment, and societal retribution. Next, Part II examines the background, enactment, purpose, 
and legislative intent of 1981a, while Part III focuses on the ineffectiveness of 1981a in 
achieving the goals of punitive damages. Finally, Part IV proposes solutions to make the act 
more effective while preventing “windfall” awards and protecting small businesses.  Statutory 
caps based on number of employees is not necessarily poor legislation; however, the law must be 
revised to improve its effectiveness while still preserving its purpose.
I. Background of Punitive Damages: History and Purpose
Punitive damages, like most aspects of American jurisprudence, have their roots in 
English law.  The awarding of punitive damages dates back to the 1760s when English courts 
recognized their purpose as exemplary.18 Early American cases show that the legal system 
recognized that civil damage awards not only compensated the victim but also provided a 
disincentive to other potential wrongdoers.19  In the first case to award punitive damages in the 
United States, the court said this remedy should be applied to punish and deter intentional torts 
17 Id.
18 See Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (K.B. 1763) (holding that the jury was “right in giving exemplary 
damages”).
19 See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 19 
(1983).   
that were "of the most atrocious and dishonorable nature."20 As the American court system 
developed, the purpose of punitive damages as deterrence, vindication, and punishment became 
well-established in the United States.21
Generally, a jury may award punitive damages if the defendant’s conduct was 
particularly malicious, willful, reckless, or oppressive.22  When awarding or reviewing punitive 
damages, courts consider a variety of factors, including the reprehensibility of the offense, 
proportionality of the punitive damages to the compensatory damages,23 the extent of the harm, 
and the intent and wealth of the defendant.24 The last factor, the wealth of the defendant, has 
received criticism from the Supreme Court25 but remains a valid consideration in most 
jurisdictions.26
In recent decades, a host of observers have directed much attention to punitive 
damages.27 While many politicians and the press decry the awarding of punitives as unfair, 
arbitrary, and out of control,28 other commentators dispute this view.29 Proponents of tort reform 
20 Coryell v. Colbaugh,  1 N.J.L. 90 (1791).
21 See Koenig Levi, supra  note 15, at 587-88, citing 1 Linda L. Schlueter & Kenneth R. Redden, Punitive Damages, 
§ 1.3(F)-(G)(4th ed. 2000); see also Coryell v. Colbaugh,  1 N.J.L. 90 (1791) (instructing the jury  “that they were 
not to estimate the damages by any particular proof of suffering or actual loss, but to give damages for example's
sake”); see also Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851) (noting the punitive damages “may properly be termed 
exemplary or vindictive rather than compensatory”).
22 See David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems, and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 364 
(1994). 
23 See State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 408 (2003).
24 See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 464 (1993).
25 See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 427.
26 See Annotation, Punitive Damages: Relationship to Defendant’s Wealth in Determining Propriety of Award, 87 
A.L.R. 4th 141, *2a (2005).
27 See generally Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1393, 1275-77 (1993). 
28 See Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 Am. U. L. Rev. 559, 564-65 (1992) (“[P]unitive damages will continue 
to generate disproportionately high awards in a random and capricious manner”); see also Casino Justice, THE 
WASHINGTON POST, July 13, 1999, at A18 (describing the legal system as a “kind of lottery in which clever trial 
lawyers and a few victims get very rich at the cost of society's confidence in the justice system”).
29 See Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with 
Empirical Data, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 44-49 (1992). Although this author only addresses punitive damages in the 
context of products liability cases, researchers have noted similar, though less convincing, data in the fields of 
medical malpractice and other tort actions. See generally Corpreform.com, 
point to “runaway juries” as the major problem and advocate statutory caps as the solution.30
What they often overlook, however, is that judges award approximately the same levels of 
punitive damages as juries, and courts often reduce the headline-grabbing awards by juries.31 In 
addition, the Supreme Court, in a series of cases addressing proportionality and propriety, has 
already “reformed” the way courts award punitive damages.32
Although substantial controversy regarding the role of punitive damages continues,33
scholars and judges alike agree that they are a necessary part of the legal system.34 Because 
criminal penalties are not available for many civil wrongs, or because the criminal remedies 
available are inadequate,35 punitive damages provide for punishment of the offender.36 When 
compensatory damages are nominal, punitive damages provide a deterrent to the prohibited 
http://www.corpreform.com/corporate_misinformation/; see also Marc Galanter, Shadow Play: The Fabled Menace 
of Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1 (1998).
30 See Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem, Recasting the 
Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 458-59 (2004). 
31 See generally  Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data And Further Inquiry, 1 WIS. L. 
REV. 15 (1998); see also Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote To Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996); 
and Michael L. Rustad, How The Common Good Is Served By The Remedy of Punitive Damages, 64 TENN. L. REV. 
793 (1997).
32 See BMW of North Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996); see also TXO, 509 U.S. at 458; and Pacific 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991). 
33 See generally William A. Lovett, Exxon Valdez, Punitive Damages, and Tort Reform, 38 TORT & INS. PRAC. L.J. 
1071, 1105-1112 (2003). "The heart of the modern tort reform controversy is a reaction to the widely perceived 
‘excesses’ of the U.S. tort and punitive damages system.” Id. 
34 See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp, 419 S.E.2d 870, 889 (1992)(noting that large punitive damages 
awards are appropriate in some cases to “attract the defendant's attention”); See generally Michael Rustad & 
Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. 
U.L. REV. 1269 (1993); see also Maria O’Brien Hylton, The Kenneth M. Piper Lectures: 2002-2003: The Changing 
World of Employee Benefits, 79 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 625, 649 (2004). “[T]he legal community generally accepts that 
punitive damages can be an effective deterrent.” Id.
35 See Ellis, Jr, supra note 19, at 2-3.
36 Id.
conduct by both the defendant and by other potential wrongdoers.37 In addition, punitive 
damages serve the societal goal of retribution to other victims who are not before the court.38
A. Punishment and Deterrence
Punitive damages serve the unique purpose of punishing the defendant and deterring 
future misconduct by the defendant and others similarly situated.39 Especially for wealthy 
defendants, relatively insubstantial compensatory damages do not begin to measure the enormity 
of the defendant's wrongful behavior and have no deterrent effect.40 For that reason, punitive 
damages should be a substantial and essential ingredient in all civil rights litigation.
Many legal experts generally regard the goals of punishment and deterrence as 
inextricably intertwined.41 Most scholars agree that punishment achieves some level of 
deterrence by rendering the defendant’s conduct unprofitable.42 One commentator states that 
plaintiffs utilize the remedy as "an orderly legal retaliation...to be preferred to a private 
vengeance, which will disturb the peace of the community... ."43 In a way, then, punitive 
damages serve as a sort of civil “law enforcement.” Another commentator explains: “Deterrence 
may be viewed as operating ex ante, in preventing prospective wrongdoers from violating the 
rules, whereas law enforcement may be seen as operating ex post, in catching and punishing 
37 See, e.g. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 186-87 (1978)(noting that, because the plaintiff was only 
awarded $749 in compensatory damages for his retaliatory discharge from employment, the employer’s conduct 
would not be deterred and the defendant would be likely to repeat his conduct in the future). 
38
 Although the Supreme Court has expressly prohibited this purpose in State Farm because of due process concerns, 
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423, it continues to be an important, though underlying, goal of punitive damages. See 
Catherine Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 351-52 (2003).
39 See Leila C. Orr, Making a Case for Wealth-Calibrated Punitive Damages, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1739, 1744-47 
(2004).
40 Id. at 1742-47.
41 See Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996)(noting that “deterrence is a purpose of punishment, rather 
than, as the formulation implies, a parallel purpose, along with punishment itself, for imposing the specific form of 
punishment that is punitive damages”).
42 See Owen, supra note 22, at 378.
43
 Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1198 (1931).
wrongdoers who are not deterred.”44 Therefore, a rational offender will recognize the potential 
ramifications of his actions and seek to avoid his contemplated behavior, which in turn increases 
compliance with the law.45
Despite the general view that the goal of American civil law is not to punish but to 
compensate,46 civil courts assess punitive damages with the same goals as those of the criminal 
justice system.47 Like criminal fines, punitive damages purport to deter harmful behavior.48 As 
the lines between civil and criminal penalties blurred in recent years,49 the Supreme Court 
remarked that punitive damages "further the aims of the criminal law: 'to punish reprehensible 
conduct and to deter its future occurrence."'50
B. Societal Compensation and Retribution Goal
Not only do punitive damages punish the defendant and provide a deterrent to potential 
future offenses, they also accomplish the societal goal of redressing the harms caused by that 
defendant to other silent victims.51 As Elizabeth Cabraser argues: “Punitive damages are not an 
entitlement of the victims, but of society: a punitive damages award is a civil punishment visited 
upon defendants to vindicate the public interest in deterrence, and to penalize conduct that 
44 See Owen, supra note 22, at 380.
45 Id.
46 See Galanter & Luban, supra note 27, at 1404.
47 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A Critique of the Backlash Against 
Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 239, 267-68; see also Galanter & Luban, supra note 27, at 1404-
07.
48
 Indeed, one court even suggested that where punitive damages prove to provide ineffective deterrence, criminal 
sanctions might be a logical next step. Rosario Necarez v. Torres Gaztambide,  633 F. Supp. 287, 298 n.15 (D.P.R. 
1986), rev’d on other grounds 820 F.2d 525 (1st Circ. 1987).
49 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime 
Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991).
50 Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 297 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)(quoting Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 486 U.S. 71, 87 (1988)(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment)).
51 See  Sharkey, supra note 38. But see State Farm, at 423. “Due process does not permit courts, in the calculation of 
punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties' hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise 
of the reprehensibility analysis.” Id. 
violates the social contract and injures society."52 Although class action suits most properly
achieve this goal,53 procedural rules often preclude this course of action where the relief sought 
is monetary.54 As a result, many victims who perceive their own pecuniary damages as 
inconsequential never redress their injuries. Therefore, although not ideal,55 society can at least 
begin to recoup its collective losses through substantial punitive damage awards. 
Punitive damages are particularly effective and necessary, on a societal level, where the 
tortfeasor is likely to escape liability.56 If the offender has a good chance of escaping liability, the 
deterrent effect of punitive damages is decreased.57 These situations most commonly occur when 
the victim either does not realize the extent or the source of his injuries, has been shamed by the 
act, is not sophisticated or financially able to bring a lawsuit, or surmises that the compensatory 
damages are too low.58
Employment discrimination cases fit these situations of underdeterrence to a tee. Victims 
often blame themselves for their injury.59 They may feel shameful or embarrassed,60 especially if 
the discrimination points to the victim’s disability as a socially-perceived weakness,61 or when 
52 See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Unfinished Business: Reaching the Due Process Limits of Punitive Damages in 
Tobacco Litigation Through Unitary Classwide Adjudication, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 979, 981 (2001).
53 See Sharkey, supra note 38, at 352.
54 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Employment discrimination class action suits are often filed as Rule 23(b)(2) classes, which 
only provides for injunctive relief. Id. 
55 See Sharkey, supra note 38, at 352 (noting that the current system sometimes results in a “windfall” for the 
plaintiff). See discussion of proposed solutions for this problem below in Part IV.
56 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 H. L. REV. 869 
(1998). 
57 See id., at 870. 
58 See Sharkey, supra note 38, at 366, see also Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 56, at 888.
59 See Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and the Shaping of Legal Standards, 
43 EMORY L.J. 151, 230 (1994). “A common reaction to discrimination is to attempt to justify the abuse through 
self-blame.” Id. 
60 See Elizabeth J. Gant, Applying Title VII “Hostile Work Environment” Analysis to Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972-An Avenue of Relief for Victims of Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment in the Schools, 98 
DICK. L. REV. 489, 511-12 (1993). 
61 See Phillips v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1277 (S.D. Ala 1999). Philips spoke slowly as the 
result of a brain injury. Id. at 1277. Although he was qualified for his job, his co-workers would mock his speech 
over the intercom, making work unbearably embarrassing for Phillips. Id. at 1278.  
the victim experiences so much degradation that he or she loses self-confidence.62 Victims of 
discrimination are more likely to be undereducated63 or poor.64 These victims are less likely to 
bring discrimination suits against their employers, and the employers will escape liability. This 
leakage prevents compensatory damages awarded to individual plaintiffs from compensating for 
the social costs of anti-social behavior. 
Additionally, other obstacles face victims of employment discrimination in the court 
system.65 Although discrimination complaints are relatively easy to file with the EEOC,66 the 
lawsuits are increasingly hard to win.67 While the success rates in judge-tried insurance and 
personal injury cases were 43.6% and 41.8%, respectively, plaintiffs in employment cases 
succeeded in only 18.7% of cases.68  Even if successful, courts overturn employment cases at a 
higher rate than other categories.69 One commentator has a theory for this dismal success rate: 
bias by the courts.70
62 See Pollard v. DuPont, 338 F. Supp. 865, 884 (W.D. Tenn. 2003). Pollard was formerly an outgoing, confident 
professional who lost her positive attributes through repeated sexual harassment by her employer. Id. 
63 See Humphrey Taylor, Americans with Disabilities Still Pervasively Disadvantaged on a Broad Range of Key 
Indicators, THE HARRIS POLL, Oct. 14, 1998, http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=152 (last 
visited Apr. 30, 2006) (noting the lower rates of high school education among the disabled population than the non-
disabled).
64 See CNNMoney.com, Women Still Lag White Males in Pay, April 20, 2004, 
http://money.cnn.com/2004/04/20/news/economy/women_earnings/ (Discussing the discrepancy in income between 
white males and women, particularly female minorities); see also Taylor, supra note 63.
65 See generally Michael Selmi, Employment Discrimination and the Problems of  Proof: A Symposium: Why Are 
Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win, 61 LA. L.REV. 555 (2001). 
66 See Jamie L. Wacks, A Proposal for Community-Based Racial Reconciliation in the United States Through 
Personal Stories, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 195, 219 (2000).
67
 Selmi, supra note 65, at 558.
68 Id., at 560-61 citing http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questata.htm.
69 See Kevin Clermont, et al., Proceeding: Show Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Court of 
Appeals, 7 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL'Y J. 547, 547-48 (2003).
70
 Selmi, supra note 65 at 561-69. For example, in ADA cases, “the court is often reluctant to see discrimination as 
the underlying cause either because of a belief that the plaintiff is not truly disabled and therefore not subject to 
discrimination or because the plaintiff has not truly suffered discrimination, as seems true in both the context of race 
and age cases.” Id. 
Discrimination victims also face a lack of attorneys willing to take on a statistically-
doomed case.71 Plaintiffs may file a complaint with their state agency, if one exists, or with the 
EEOC.72 Unfortunately, the EEOC is under-funded and has such a backlog of cases that the 
average time before a case is even considered ready to litigate is over 600 days.73 That leaves 
private attorneys as the only effective option. However, even with the attorney’s fees provisions 
of the Civil Rights Act,74 most cases present too great a risk for the few employment 
discrimination attorneys who remain because attorney’s fees are available only when the plaintiff 
prevails.75 Undoubtedly, some attorneys are not motivated solely by profit.76 However, these 
attorneys not only run the risk of obtaining a settlement with no provision for attorney’s fees,77
but the capital required to litigate a discrimination case when the collection of fees could be over 
five years away also puts many public interest and small law firms out of the market.78
Despite the best intentions of members of Congress in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 to “encourage victims to pursue their claims, create an incentive for attorneys to take such 
cases, and provide a greater economic threat to employers,"79 the unfortunate reality is that 
71 See Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 457, 487 (1992).
72 See id.
73 See id. at  480-481 citing EEOC Delays in Processing Age Discrimination Charges: Hearing Before a Subcomm. 
on Employment and Housing of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 37, 40 
(1988)(statement of Clarence Thomas, Chairman, EEOC).
74
 42 U.S.C.S. 2000e-5(k).
75 See generally Summers, supra note 71.
76 See Selmi, supra note 65 at 569-70.
77 See generally Summers, supra note 71, at 487-89. 
 If the employer offers a settlement with no provision for an attorney's fees, the lawyer is 
ethically obligated to communicate the offer to the plaintiff, and if the plaintiff accepts, 
the lawyer is bound. The Supreme Court has held that it is within the trial court's 
discretion to approve such settlements, barring the lawyer from claiming an additional 
amount for attorney's fees. Once scorched by a fee waiver settlement, a lawyer may 
refuse to take future cases. 
Id. 
78 See generally id.
79 See Michael Mankes, Comment, Combating Individual Employment Discrimination in the United States and 
Great Britain: A Novel Remedial Approach, 16 COMP. LAB. L.J. 67, 79 (1994).
employers still dominate.80 Therefore, it is important, as a society, to increase the deterrent value 
in order to decrease the number of future victims. This also fulfills the societal goal of ensuring 
that “citizens who engage in such contemptible behavior against other citizens receive society’s 
full rebuke and condemnation”81 and “promotes confidence in the legal system by reassuring 
victims and others that justice has been done.”82
II. Background of 1981a: Purpose and Legislative History
Since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (which included Title VII prohibiting 
discrimination in employment)83 and the ADA in 1990,84 the equal rights of women and the 
disabled have been an important feature of our legal system.85  However, prior to the passage of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, plaintiffs in Title VII and ADA actions could only seek equitable 
relief and were not entitled to a jury trial, rendering these laws “toothless tigers.”86 Although 
victims of discrimination based on race or national origin could seek a variety of damages based 
on section 1981 (which prohibits racial discrimination), including compensatory damages and 
punitive damages in addition to equitable relief,87 the limited remedies available to victims of sex 
and disability discrimination were inadequate.88 Before 1981a was enacted, these victims could 
80 See generally Clermont, et al., supra note 69. 
81 United States v. Big D. Enter., Inc., 184 F.3d 924, 934 (8th Cir. 1999).
82
 Timothy J. Moran, Punitive Damages in Fair Housing Litigation: Ending Unwise Restrictions on a Necessary 
Remedy, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 295 (2001). 
83
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
84
 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. 
85 See generally Douglas M. Staudmeister, Grasping the Intangible: A Guide to Assessing Nonpecuniary Damages 
in the EEOC Administrative Process, 46 AM. U.L. REV. 189, 190 (1996).
86 See Roy L. Brooks, A Roadmap Through Title VII’s Procedural and Remedial Labyrinth, 24 SW. U. L. REV. 511, 
511, (1995); see also EEOC.gov, 1965-1971: A “Toothless Tiger” Helps Shape the Law and Educates the Public,
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/1965-71/index.html
87
 42 U.S.C.S. 1981.
88 See EEOC.gov, Closing the Gaps - Making Title VII More Effective for All: Damages, Jury Trials, and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/40th/panel/closinggaps.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2005).
only hope to receive injunctive relief89 and attorney’s fees.90 These limited remedies did not 
provide enough incentive to encourage mistreated employees to stand up for their rights and to 
seek a legal remedy.91
Meanwhile, in the late 1980s, the Supreme Court began dismantling the protections 
against discrimination offered by Title VII.92 Several decisions during the Supreme Court term of 
1988-89 restructured the future path of federal civil rights enforcement, particularly in the area of 
employment discrimination.93 These decisions weakened both a plaintiff’s ability to prevail in an 
employment discrimination action and the remedies available to a successful plaintiff.94
The first of a series of four cases to come out of this term and prompt legislative action 
was Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.95 This case held that section 1981 does not cover post-
hiring racial discrimination. The Court’s decision in Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. 
dropped another bombshell. 96 In that case, the Court held that the statute of limitations had run, 
preventing plaintiffs from challenging a seniority system governing layoffs implemented to 
intentionally discriminate against female employees because they waited until the layoffs 
actually occurred instead of suing when the policy was implemented.97 In Martin v. Wilks, the 
Court provided for almost unlimited challenges to consent decrees formed to resolve 
employment discrimination disputes, thereby threatening existing decrees with constant 
89
 The injunctive relief is for the employee to be reinstated in the hostile work environment. This, of course, is not an  
effective or appropriate remedy in the majority of cases.
90 See EEOC.gov, Closing the Gaps, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/40th/panel/closinggaps.html.
91 See id.
92 See generally Reginald C. Govan, Honorable Compromises and the Moral High Ground: The Conflict Between 
the Rhetoric and the Content of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 17-23 (1993). 
93 See id. at 19. 
94
 See id. at 23-31.  
95 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
96 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
97 Id. at 911.
challenge and diminishing their value in resolving future Title VII disputes.98 The fourth case 
decided in June of 1989 that further diminished the rights of victims of employment 
discrimination was Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio.99 In that case, the Court held that 
employers do not have the burden of proving a business necessity to justify practices that have a 
disparate impact on protected classes.100
Critics decried these Supreme Court decisions as a retreat from the great strides made in 
the last century in protecting the rights of underprivileged minorities.101 Civil rights 
organizations and some members of Congress maintained that legislation was needed to restore 
correct interpretations of the law102 and also to reconcile the differences in remedies available for 
different kinds of discrimination.103 The George H.W. Bush Administration and the business 
lobby, however, contended that restorative “legislation isn’t necessary.”104 Nevertheless, this did 
not deter activists and progressive politicians from pursuing a remedy and developing legislation 
to overturn these unpopular decisions.105 The inequity in remedies available to victims of 
different types of discrimination,106 as well as these Supreme Court cases, provided the 
motivation Congress needed to reform the remedies available under Title VII and the ADA.107
In 1991, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act. One major change in the 1991 Act was 
the availability of compensatory and punitive damages to victims of intentional disability and sex 
98
 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
99
 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
100 Id. at 659.
101 See generally Govan, supra note 92, at 23-24.
102 See Charles Rothfeld, Rulings on Job Bias: Chilling Effect on Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1989, at Section B; 
Page 7, Column 3; see also Govan, supra note 92, at 28.
103 See Stacy A. Hickox, Reduction of Punitive Damages for Employment Discrimination: Are Courts Ignoring our 
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discrimination.108 Punitive damages were available for victims of discrimination who could 
prove that the employer “engaged in a discriminatory practice . . . with malice or with reckless 
indifference to the federally protected rights of the aggrieved individual.”109 Congress’s intent 
for the inclusion of punitive damages was to “punish employers for their unlawful conduct, to 
reinforce public policy against discrimination, and to deter future discrimination.”110 Opponents 
of the Act argued that including compensatory and punitive damages would invite frivolous 
lawsuits and huge damage awards.111 Therefore, the Act included a cap on damages as a 
compromise between Congress and the Bush Administration-backed business lobby.112 The 
compromise calibrated the cap in four tiers, with the applicable tier dependant on the number of 
employees the offending employer employed during the previous year.113 Employers with 15-
100 employees have damages capped at $50,000, while employers with 101-200 employees have 
a damage cap of $100,000; 201-500 employees means a cap of $200,000, and for employers with 
501 or more employees, the cap is $300,000.114 The damages cap applies to the aggregate sum of 
compensatory and punitive damages.115
By placing caps on the total of compensatory and punitive damages, Congress clipped the 
teeth of the Act and tied the hands of judges seeking to further justice. Section 1981a forces 
judges to reduce jury awards despite the demands of justice116 and a historical tradition of 
deference to a jury’s verdict.117 Although punitive damage awards are generally reviewable,118
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judges are not, in cases without damage caps, required to reduce the jury’s award.119 The 
traditional respect of the jury120 and the historical reluctance to alter a jury’s verdict makes 
modern judges hesitant to reduce a jury’s award.121 However, with Section 1981a’s cap on 
damages, this deference to the jury’s verdict is eliminated. One court noted that $300,000 was 
[I]nsufficient to compensate plaintiff for the psychological damage, pain, and humiliation 
she has suffered, in addition to the loss of a lucrative career and secure retirement. The 
Court is bound by the statutory cap set forth in § 1981a however, and cannot award 
plaintiff compensatory damages in excess of that cap.122
The damage caps limit the ability of judges to achieve a “just result.”
III. Why 1981a is Ineffective
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to help combat the persistence of 
employment discrimination123 by adding compensatory and punitive damages to effectuate a 
greater level of deterrence.124 Although the Act succeeded in re-establishing some rights that the 
Supreme Court had rolled back in its decisions of the 1988-89 term and brought the remedies 
available under Title VII in line with other anti-discrimination statutes, the compromises made to 
guarantee passage of the bill weakened the best intentions of legislators. Judging from the level 
of recidivism, the Act, with its caps on damages, has not achieved its goal of eliminating the 
118 See generally id. (discussing the 17th century English origins of the court’s power to set aside jury verdicts that 
are considered excessive).
119 See generally BMW, 517 U.S. 559, for a discussion of when a reduction is reasonable and affirming that there is 
no bright line rule to guide judges in determining the excessiveness of punitive damages.
120 See Austin Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REV. 669, 676 (1918)( the jury 
was regarded  “as a bulwark of liberty, as a means of preventing oppression by the Crown”).
121 See Copley v. Bax Global., Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1171, 2000. 
122 Pollard v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, Inc., 16 F.Supp. 2d 913, 924 n19 (1998). 
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Employment by David A. Strauss, 79 GEO. L.J. 1695, 1696-98 (1991) (examining recent sociological research on 
discrimination).
124 See Hickox, supra note 103, at 1083 citing 137 Cong. Rec. H9526 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. 
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persistent problem of employment discrimination. In particular, the caps on punitive damages 
prevent courts from assuring a just result in all cases. The caps also diminish the deterrent effect 
and the societal compensation for egregious conduct by large employers.
One important reason why damage caps undermine the deterrent effect of punitive 
damages is that they allow potential defendants to include the maximum damage award into their 
cost of doing business.125 Predictability of the cost of damages enables a company to do a cost-
benefit assessment to decide whether instituting company-wide anti-discrimination training or 
similar preventive measures is profitable.126 In addition, companies can factor in the low 
probability of getting “caught” for discrimination.127 Therefore, while a small company may take 
affirmative steps in the training of its management and employees to prevent discrimination, a 
large company with thousands or millions of employees might very well decide it is more 
profitable to instead absorb the cost of a capped damage award for its discriminatory practices. 
Damages then become merely a fee, allowing defendants to “continue their misconduct for a 
price.”128
A good example of this lack of deterrence is the repeat offenses committed by the 
corporate giant Wal-Mart. Although Wal-Mart is surely not the only, or even worst, offender of 
anti-discrimination laws, its large size129 and repeated discrimination violations make it an 
appropriate illustration of the drawbacks of the damage caps of section 1981a. The damages that 
Wal-Mart has to pay do not have a deterrent effect, as evidenced by its continued violation of 
125
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anti-discrimination statutes.130 In ten years, the EEOC alone has filed sixteen lawsuits against 
Wal-Mart for violation of the ADA.131
In one particularly reprehensible case, Wal-Mart refused to hire two deaf men on the 
basis of their disability.132 The men filed suit through the EEOC and subsequently entered into a 
consent decree with Wal-Mart.133 The consent decree detailed the actions the court required Wal-
Mart to take, including paying back pay, compensatory damages and attorney’s fees, and 
providing full-time jobs for the two men, complete with interpreters for meetings and training.134
Wal-Mart also agreed to implement an extensive training program on the ADA135 and to 
complete these measures within 18 months.136
Unfortunately, at the expiration of the consent decree, Wal-Mart had failed to comply.137
It did not provide timely reports of its compliance; it did not provide interpreters; and it failed to 
train its staff.138 The district court found Wal-Mart in contempt and ordered it to comply with the 
decree, to pay a $750,200 sanction to the Arizona Center for Disability Law, and to run a local 
television commercial stating it had violated the ADA and referring people who believe they 
have been discriminated against on the basis of disability to contact the EEOC.139
Despite these sanctions, Wal-Mart has not stopped its discriminatory practices. The 
EEOC filed another ADA suit against Wal-Mart for refusing to provide reasonable 
130 See EEOC.gov, Wal-Mart Violates Disabilities Act Again; EEOC Files 16th ADA Suits Against Retail Giant, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/press/6-21-01.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2005).
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accommodation to Plaintiff Alice Rehberg.140 Ms. Rehberg is limited in the amount of time she 
can stand, yet Wal-Mart refused to let her occasionally sit during her shift as a “greeter.”141 Wal-
Mart constructively discharged Ms. Rehberg from her position, and the EEOC filed suit.142
Wal-Mart subjected another employee to a hostile work environment and eventually 
terminated him because of his disability.143 Plaintiff Phillips sustained a traumatic brain injury in 
a near-fatal auto accident144 and, after surviving a four-month coma, he started the long journey 
to rehabilitation.145 As a result of his brain injury, his speech is slow, and he has trouble 
concentrating, experiences dizziness and headaches, and has difficulty with his fine motor 
skills.146 Fourteen years after the accident, after re-learning how to eat, talk, walk and take care 
of himself, Phillips obtained employment at Sears with the help of the Alabama Department of 
Rehabilitation Services (ADRS).147 Sears eliminated his position in 1993, but ADRS helped him 
to gain employment at Wal-Mart.148
During his work in the night receiving department, his supervisor berated him for being 
slow and unproductive.149 His supervisor and co-workers made fun of him and mocked his slow 
speech over the store intercom.150 The store manager even yelled at him for making a 
suggestion.151 Although the store’s management never reprimanded Phillips for having a bad 
attitude, he was nonetheless fired for his poor attitude and performance.152
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Wal-Mart has refused to hire a man with an amputated arm, a pregnant woman, a 
wheelchair user, and a man with cerebral palsy.153 It is clear that Wal-Mart perceives that it is 
immune from punishment.154 When the maximum possible penalty that Wal-Mart might have to 
pay is capped at $300,000, Wal-Mart can be assured that punishment for its actions will not cut 
into its profits. 
Recently, the “commercial titan”155 produced a memorandum outlining how the company 
could save money by reducing healthcare costs.156 This memorandum exemplifies the flippant 
philosophy of Wal-Mart regarding workers with disabilities.157 In the memo, Executive Vice 
President of Risk Management and Benefits Susan Chambers158 recommends attracting a 
“healthier workforce” by requiring physical activity in all job categories, “e.g. all cashiers do 
some cart gathering.”159 One lawyer has referred to the memorandum as “a cesspool of legal 
violations,” and the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing calls it “very 
alarming.”160 Chambers’ blatant recommendation that Wal-Mart introduce these changes to 
“dissuade unhealthy people from coming to work at Wal-Mart” shows a complete disregard for 
ADA regulations. Furthermore, it proves that the multiple lawsuits brought against the company 
its motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1288. The court’s unfortunate conclusion, however, does not detract from 
the facts illustrative for the purposes of this discussion that Wal-Mart is insensitive to its workers’ “impairments” 
and apparently provides minimal, if any, anti-discrimination training to its management.
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have not had the desired deterrent effect to prevent this systematic discrimination by “the world’s 
largest retailer.”161
IV. Proposed Reforms
The previous examples of Wal-Mart’s repeated violations of anti-discrimination statutes 
illustrate that the current caps on punitive damages do not have the desired deterrent effect. The 
following proposed solutions would increase deterrence while expressly conforming to the 
legislative intent of providing a ceiling on damages to protect small businesses. These proposed 
reforms are: 1) Keep the current caps based on “number of employees,” but recalibrate the tiers 
to account for very large employers; 2) Eliminate the “number of employees” calculations and 
instead base caps on the net worth of the offending employer; and 3) Increase the punitive 
damages caps in cases of repeat violations of similar anti-discrimination statutes. 
A. Reform the Current “Number of Employees” Scheme
One potentially effective solution is to retain the current “number of employees” scheme 
but continue increasing the caps to make the damages for employers with thousands or even 
millions of employees more proportional to the overall size of the business. The basis of section 
1981a’s remedial scheme has a solid foundation: make the caps proportionate to the size of the 
business in order to protect relatively small businesses from financial ruin, in addition to 
deterring frivolous lawsuits.162 However, the caps stop at 500 employees, subjecting thousands 
of businesses to the same cap despite wide differences in number of employees. For example, 
161 Brady, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12151 at *11 (citing Wal -Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. 396 F.3d 96, 101 
(2d Circ. 2005)); Walmartfacts.com supra note 129, http://www.walmartfacts.com/doyouknow/default.aspx#a23.
162 See Hickox, supra note 103, at 1084, citing 137 Cong. Rec. S15472 (1991) (statement of Sen. Dole).
Air Transport, Inc., a company with 555 employees nationwide,163 has to bear the same burden 
as Wal-Mart, which has 1.2 million employees in the United States.164
If the law recalibrated cap levels to take into account massive employers such as Wal-
Mart, the matrix would look something like this:165
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES CAP
From To
15 100 $50,000.00
101 200 $100,000.00
201 500 $200,000.00
501 1,000 $300,000.00
1,001 2,000 $600,000.00
2,001 4,000 $1,200,000.00
4,001 8,000 $2,400,000.00
8,001 16,000 $4,800,000.00
16,001 32,000 $9,600,000.00
32,001 64,000 $19,200,000.00
64,001 128,000 $38,400,000.00
128,001 256,000 $76,800,000.00
256,001 512,000 $153,600,000.00
512,001 1,024,000 $307,200,000.00
1,024,001 2,048,000 $614,400,000.00
2,048,001 4,096,000 $1,228,800,000.00
4,096,001 8,192,000 $2,457,600,000.00
8,192,001 16,384,000 $4,915,200,000.00
16,384,001 32,768,000 $9,830,400,000.00
32,768,001 65,536,000 $19,660,800,000.00
This matrix would place Wal-Mart in the tier with a $614,400,000 cap and keep Air Transport, 
Inc.’s cap at $300,000. 
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column. 
A related cap formula based on the existing “number of employees” system would assess 
a cap of $500 per employee. Such a formula avoids lumping a very small company of fifteen 
employees with a business that is over six times as large. Using this formula, the cap for a 
business with fifteen employees would be $7,500, while a business with 100 employees would 
be subject to a $50,000 cap. Likewise, Air Transport, Inc., would have a cap of $277,500 while 
Wal-Mart’s would be $600 million. This formula results in an assessment of damages that is 
directly proportionate to the size of the employer and furthers the legislative intent of protecting 
small businesses from financial ruin. 166
B. Base the Caps on Net Worth
American jurisprudence generally accepts that punitive damages, absent statutory 
guidance, may be based on the reprehensibility of the defendant’s act, the extent of the harm 
actual caused or intended to cause, or the wealth of the defendant.167 Indeed, some states now 
require a jury to consider the defendant’s wealth in assessing punitive damages.168 The rationale, 
of course, is that it takes a higher dollar amount to punish a rich person than a poor one.169 A 
typical ratio of punitive damages to defendant’s net worth is about one percent.170
One early American case authorized the use of wealth in determining the size of punitive 
damages to send an “impressive lesson” to rich, oppressive companies that exploited their 
166 See generally Govan, supra note 92, at 103.
167
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power.171 The Goddard court wrote: "There is one but vulnerable point about these ideal 
existences, called corporations; and that is, the pocket of the monied power that is concealed 
behind them; and if that is reached they will wince."172 The court reasoned that "when it is 
thoroughly understood that it is not profitable to employ careless and indifferent agents, or 
reckless and insolent servants, better [employees] will take their places, and not before."173
Another way to frame the inadequacy of an award is to figure the amount of time it took 
the offending business to earn the amount awarded,174 as Judge Orenstein did in Brady v. Wal-
Mart.175 Some courts have held one week is an accepted amount of time on which to base an 
award.176
As previously discussed, Air Transport, Inc., with 555 employees, is subject to the same 
damages cap as Wal-Mart, with 1.7 million employees. The net worth of these two companies is 
as dissimilar as their respective number of employees. In 2004, Air Transport, Inc. had a net 
worth of $15.4 million.177 Wal-Mart, on the other hand, had a net worth of $13.6 BILLION.178
The ratio for a punitive damages award of $300,000 to Wal-Mart’s net worth is .02%. By 
comparison, $300,000 is 1.9% of Air Transport, Inc.’s net worth. Additionally, Wal-Mart earns 
$300,000 in significantly less than one week. In fact, according to Brady v. Wal-Mart, it took 
171Goddard v. Grand Truck Railway of Canada, 57 Me. 202, 222 (1869).
172 Id. at 224, 228.
173 Id. at 224.
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Wal-Mart only 37 seconds to earn $300,000.179 Wal-Mart’s figures do not come close to the 
generally accepted amount of time or percentage of net worth. 
If the caps under 1981a were based on the accepted one percent, Wal-Mart’s cap would 
be $136 million. By comparison, Air Transport, Inc. would be subject to a cap of $154,000. 
These amounts, of course, are just the caps on allowable awards. A jury may award any amount 
it deems appropriate,180 but the judge would still have to reduce the award to accommodate the 
cap. The caps are a ceiling to preserve the viability of the defendants’ businesses. 
Because the intent of Congress was to protect small businesses, the most effective way to 
achieve that goal would be to base the caps on the net worth of the employer. Caps calculated in 
this way would be fairer to all parties because “the limits would be related to ability to pay, not 
to an arbitrary personnel count” and would adequately punish large, wealthy businesses. 181
C. Increase the Caps with Each Subsequent Violation
Wal-Mart’s repeated violation of civil rights laws shows that the current statutory caps do 
not deter its conduct. If the maximum amount of punitive damages increased with each recidivist 
act, increasingly large awards would eventually deter it. The Supreme Court recognized that “a 
recidivist may be punished more severely than a first offender” because “repeated misconduct is 
more reprehensible than an individual instance of malfeasance."182 The “existence and 
frequency”183 of Wal-Mart’s prior violations of discrimination laws would make them subject to 
greater penalties with every transgression. 
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The Supreme Court has expressed concerns with application of stiffer penalties for 
recidivist defendants in the civil context.184 In State Farm, the Court discussed that the 
consideration of prior, extraterritorial misconduct "creates the possibility of multiple punitive 
damage awards for the same conduct; for in the usual case nonparties are not bound by the 
judgment another plaintiff obtains."185 This problem could be avoided, however, by mandating 
that jury instructions require consideration be given to prior punitive awards for the same course 
of conduct and that appellate courts factor such prior awards into excessiveness review.186
Increased penalties for subsequent violations raise the stakes each time a defendant 
engages in similar bad behavior.187 Harsher penalties for repeated criminal conduct is a common 
and traditional concept in criminal law.188 Every jurisdiction today has some punishment scheme 
that takes prior criminal acts into consideration during sentencing.189 Although the effectiveness 
of sentencing guidelines that take this approach, such as California’s “three strikes” law, have 
had mixed reviews,190 in cases of employment discrimination, increased penalties would force 
businesses to reevaluate their policies and training programs and take proactive measures to 
prevent future violations. 
D. Tempering “Windfall” Recoveries with Split-Recovery Statutes
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One major concern with these solutions to the current cap scheme is that plaintiffs may 
receive “windfall” damage awards.191 This could be easily remedied, however, by the addition of 
a split-recovery scheme.192 Under a split-recovery statute, a pre-determined portion of punitive 
damage awards are earmarked to go to a specific public service fund or to the treasury as another 
form of revenue.193 Nine states currently have split-recovery statutes for punitive damages 
arising out of state tort actions: Alaska, Georgia, Utah, Iowa, Missouri, Oregon, Indiana, 
Illinois,194 and California.195 The designated destination of the state’s portion varies from a low-
income legal services fund in Missouri to the general state treasury in Alaska, Georgia, and 
Utah.196 The percentage allocated to the state treasury or special fund varies from fifty to 
seventy-five percent.197
Although there are currently no federal split-recovery laws, the Supreme Court has 
already expressed acceptance of the idea.198 In actions for employment discrimination, the split-
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The Legislature finds and declares that extraordinary and dire budgetary needs have forced the 
enactment of this extraordinary measure to allocate temporarily for the state's Public Benefit Trust 
Fund a substantial portion of any punitive damages paid from a judgment during the limited time 
period specified in the statute. ...Punitive damages awarded ... shall be paid, as follows: (1) 
Seventy-five percent shall be paid to the Public Benefit Trust Fund, which is hereby created in the 
State Treasury, to be administered by the Department of Finance. Amounts deposited into the 
Public Benefit Trust Fund shall be available for annual appropriation in the Budget Act and shall 
be used for purposes consisted with the nature of the award, but in no case shall be used to fund 
the courts or judicial programs. Amounts deposited in the Public Benefit Trust Fund shall also be 
available for the purposes specified in subdivision (d). (2) Twenty-five percent to the plaintiff or 
plaintiffs. 
Id.
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recovery statute could authorize the distribution of part of the punitive damage award to the 
EEOC or charitable organizations that work toward the elimination of discrimination.199 In 
addition to resolving concerns with “windfall” awards, this solution would increase the societal 
goal of retribution200 by donating money to organizations that work to alleviate the societal 
problem of discrimination.
Conclusion
The current statutory caps on punitive damages in intentional employment discrimination 
do not allow for effective enforcement of anti-discrimination laws. As evidenced by Wal-Mart’s 
recidivism, the caps do not promote deterrence, nor do they reflect society’s revulsion for 
discriminatory acts. Particularly in the context of employment discrimination, where victims may 
be reluctant to or incapable of seeking retribution, effective deterrence in the form of significant 
punitive damages is crucial to achieving a just employment arena. Possible means to achieve 
meaningful punitive damage awards while still protecting small employers from financial ruin 
include recalibrating the caps to increase penalties for large corporations, base the caps on net 
worth, or increasing damage caps for repeat violations. In each instance, enacting a split-
recovery statute can circumvent windfall awards, thereby deterring frivolous lawsuits while 
funneling resources into under-funded charities or government agencies whose goal is to help 
victims of discrimination. Caps based on number of employees is not necessarily bad policy; 
however, the law must be reformed in order to render the caps effective while still preserving 
their purpose. 
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